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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
The new millennium has brought a significant andgrowing revival of classic Chinese traditions, partic-ularly “Confucianism,” in mainland China.((1) This
phenomenon is not limited to political utilization of culture,
nor is it purely the prerogative of the elite. Rather, it has
spread progressively to different strata of society, taking on
different forms in various states of maturity. It can be best
perceived in the area of education, where “reading the clas-
sics” by children, rediscovery of ancient institutions, and “na-
tional studies” (guoxue) courses for businessmen are some
examples of the current movement. 
The double-faced phenomenon under discussion, well ex-
pressed by the traditional word jiaohua (transformation of
self and training dispensed to others), occurs at a specific
historical juncture in which past “traditions” as well as future
projects, both realistic and utopian, contribute to the affirma-
tion of the role of Chinese culture. New Confucian engage-
ments have come into being in the interval between the
evolving post-communist “structure of experience” and the
suddenly enlarged “horizon of expectation” made possible
by the development and the opening up of Chinese soci-
ety.((2)
It is therefore necessary to describe briefly the context of
this “Confucian” rediscovery of education before consider-
ing how it is taking form and becoming institutionalized.
This will help to provide a better understanding of one of its
main features — its paradoxical anti-intellectualism. 
Between reco llect ion andanticipation:  the context  andissues  of  a “Confucian”rediscovery o f  education.  
We shall first examine what is new in the cultural historicity
of the first decade of the twenty-first century before consid-
ering briefly the evolution of Confucianism-inspired educa-
tive institutions in the twentieth century. 
The new  conjuncture  of  the  2000s 
To describe the new spirit, it might be useful to compare the
different significations attached to the concept of “tradition”
during the last three decades.  
In the 1980s and the aftermath of Maoism, intellectuals in
favour of reviving the Chinese “Enlightenment” (qimeng)
chose the notion of tradition (chuantong) as the object of a
double rejection: not only was “tradition” used to designate
the imperial past, conceived of as immobile and despotic,
This article explores the rediscovery of “Confucianism” in mainland China in the field of education, understood in
the broad sense of training dispensed to others and self-cultivation. It begins by examining the general context of the
phenomenon and then analyzes how it is currently taking form and becoming institutionalized. On such a basis, it
becomes possible to better understand one of its main features – its paradoxical anti-intellectualism. 
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1. The product of a modern science of religions that came into being in Europe during the
nineteenth century, “Confucianism” is an occidental concept which only partially over-
laps the Chinese notions of rujia and/or rujiao. These notions can also cover meanings
that are very different depending on historical context. We therefore put this term in
quotation marks, since in a modern context it expresses more of an assertion of iden-
tity than an objective reality.
2. Reinhart Koselleck, “Erfahrungsraum und Erwartungshorizont : zwei historische Kate-
gorien”, Vergangene Zukunft, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, 1989, pp. 349-375
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but it was also used to refer to Maoist communism, inter-
preted, after the disappointed expectations of the 1919 May
4th Movement, as falling back on tradition. In the 1990s, after
the traumatic episode of Tiananmen, a very different situa-
tion appeared. Two differentiated processes became appar-
ent before their effects were progressively combined around
the increasingly vague category of “national studies”
(guoxue). At first, this was a movement affecting an aca-
demic elite. At the outset, it was not characterized by the
neo-nationalist spirit that emerged later — it put the empha-
sis simultaneously on going beyond naive Occidentalism, a
feature of the previous decade,((3) and on a determination to
depoliticise. In fact, this new research on Chinese history
and culture had its roots in xueshu, meaning scientific or ac-
ademic value, as opposed to sixiang, an ambiguous term for
“thought” that was also used under Mao to designate “offi-
cial” ideology. Parallel to this affirmation of intellectual inde-
pendence of the 1990s was the burgeoning of a form of mass
culture (dazhong wenhua) made possible by the revival of
market economy after 1992. Although the consumerist ap-
petite was not initially attracted to products of a “traditional”
nature, the market became progressively imbued with “Chi-
nese” references, which attained legitimacy not only through
the advance of national studies but especially through the
openly nationalistic direction of official political doctrine.  
The 2000s brought significant progress in the appropriation
of “tradition.” First of all, there was a progressive transition
from the imaginary to the real. While the immediate post-
Mao era could only give birth to a “dreamed-up tradition”
because of the widespread destruction of traditional culture,
it gradually became possible to re-establish, at least partially,
historic continuities that had previously been rejected or ig-
nored.((4) At the same time, there was a transition from the-
ory to practice. Empty, incantatory references to tradition
made way for actual appropriations of ancient cultural her-
itage, obviously at the expense of ongoing transformation or
reinvention. Traditional values were no longer merely in-
voked; an effort was made to actually live according to them
in various ways, from family rituals to styles of dress or dec-
orative arts.((5) These diversified practices were encouraged
by a new climate in the media giving considerable attention
to imperial references, historical television series being one
of the most striking examples. 
How does the revival of Confucianism fit into this context of
“cultural tradition” in general? 
We should beware of simplistic interpretations of these phe-
nomena, first of all, because of their multifaceted and rela-
tively elusive nature in the context of such a large popula-
tion, and secondly, because the movements in question co-
exist with others indifferent or hostile to them. In particular,
the “Confucian” revival actually gave rise to anti-Confucian-
ism of a new type that at times served to lend support to old
arguments. An illustration of this can be seen in the 2007
debate in which intellectuals favouring a cultural “renais-
sance” (wenyi fuxing) were opposed to those promoting a
neo-traditionalist “moral reconstruction” (daode chongjian)
— in a sense, the former, liberal and individualist, were the
heirs of the “Enlightenment” movement.((6)
One could argue that this is not necessarily a new phenom-
enon: after all, the 1980s witnessed a “Confucian renais-
sance” in East Asia during the economic development of the
“Four Little Dragons” and the rediscovery of the famous
“Asian values.”((7) The consequences of the financial crisis of
1997 and the end of the Singaporean dream contributed to
the emergence of more modest and nuanced attitudes. Sev-
eral considerations, however, indicate that this is a long-term
tendency for China, a historical trend subject to cycles of
variable speed and importance that do not compromise its
long-term evolution.  
In fact, whereas references to the Confucian revival previ-
ously arose outside of China’s borders (East and South-East
Asia, the Diaspora), they became well established within
3. For more on the intellectual climate of this rediscovery of Chinese “cultural tradition”
after the Cultural Revolution and on the “comparatist” perspective that places it in rela-
tion to “Western culture,” see Joël Thoraval, “La fièvre culturelle chinoise : de la
stratégie à la théorie,” Critique, n° 507-508, 1989, pp. 558-572. 
4. Joël Thoraval, “La tradition rêvée, réflexions sur L’Elégie du fleuve de Su Xiaokang,” L’In-
fini, 1990, pp.146-68.
5. We could cite many other symptoms of this fragmented return of the past: the present
fashion of genealogies (jiapu), the revival of certain popular holidays, the passion for
Chinese antiques, the evolution of names given to businesses (it was fashionable in the
1980s to give Western-sounding names, but now it is more common to use traditional
ones), more traditional decoration of restaurants, the renewed popularity of “tea cul-
ture,” etc.
6. See for instance, Liu Junning, “Zhongguo, ni xuyao yi chang wenyifuxing !” (China, you
need a renaissance!), Nanfang Zhoumou, 07/12/2006, p.B15 ; Shu Qinfeng, “Zhongguo
zhen de xuyao yi chang wenyifuxing” (China really needs a renaissance), Liaowang
Zhoukan, 28/12/2006, p.74-76 ; Qiu Feng, “Zhongguo xuyao wenyifuxing hai shi bie de
yundong ?” (Does China need a renaissance or another movement?), Nanfang Zhoumou,
21/12/2006, p.B15; Qiu Feng, “Zhongguo xuyao daode chongjian yu shehui jianshe yun-
dong” (China needs a movement for moral reconstruction and social construction), Nan-
fang Zhoumou, 08/02/2007, p.B15 ; Qiu Feng, “Daode chongjian, shehui jianshe yu geti
zunyan” (Moral reconstruction, social reconstruction, and the dignity of the individual),
Nanfang Zhoumou, 18/01/2007, p.D29; Cui Weiping, “Women de zunyan zaiyu yongyou
jiazhi lixiang” (Our dignity comes from having an ideal in terms of values), Nanfang
Zhoumou, 11/01/2007, p.B14. “Wenyifuxing haishi daode chongjian ?” (Renaissance or
moral reconstruction?), Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan, 22/01/2007, p.2. Li Jing, “Geren de
jingshen chengshu yu Zhongguo wenyi fuxing” (Spiritual maturity of the individual and
Chinese renaissance), Nanfang Zhoumou, 25/01/2007, p.B15.
7. There is a substantial literature on the topic. See for example: David Camroux and Jean-
Luc Domenach (eds.), Imagining Asia, The Construction of an Asian Regional Identity,
London, Routledge, 1997 and Mizoguchi Yûzô and Nakajima Mineo, Jukyô runessansu
wo kangaeru (Reflecting on Confucian Renaissance), Tokyo : Daishûkan shoten, 1991.
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the mainland due to a calculated, but nevertheless decisive,
official policy, of tolerance.((8) This new condition makes it
possible to study the enormous “Confucian” heritage in
greater depth. 
The first decade of the twenty-first century has been charac-
terized by three changes. First of all, “Confucianism” is no
longer simply perceived as a means to an end, serving devel-
opment or “modernization.” The “Weber Fever” of the
1990s never went beyond an attempt to reread Max Weber
in the search for examples of a positive relationship between
Confucianism and capitalism.((9) Confucian thought or ideol-
ogy now claims to find within itself both its foundation and
its perspectives for the future. Some of its theorists maintain
that Confucianism no longer serves as a complement to
Western thought, but intends to replace it. Secondly, an in-
terest in texts and practices inspired by “Confucianism” has
ceased to be the privilege of the intellectual elite and has
sparked the enthusiasm of the general population. There is
a deliberate affirmation of movements based on “popular”
Confucianism (minjian rujia) outside the sphere of intellec-
tuals and official authorities. Lastly, the progression of Con-
fucian practices, even when their importance remained local
or regional, now raises the question of their institutionalisa-
tion. This revision of institutional forms consequently creates
potential conflicts with existing authorities, from whom de
facto tolerance or official recognition is expected. For Con-
fucianism, the organisational structures of which were largely
destroyed during the last century, this question of institu-
tional forms applies in various degrees to three areas: poli-
tics, religion, and education. Since our study concerns edu-
cation, we shall briefly review the fate of the classic institu-
tion of Confucianism during the twentieth century. 
The paradoxical  dest iny of  the  Confucianclassi c institution in the  twentiethcentury 
The current wave of enthusiasm for traditional culture,
dreams projected onto former practices and institutions, did
not emerge ex nihilo. In fact, contrary to popular belief
(which is itself simply the product of anti-traditionalist ideol-
ogy that dominated the twentieth century because of the
specific characteristics of Chinese nationalism), the modern
transformation of the education system produced resistance,
sometimes even within the modernising camp. One of the
benefits offered by the current resurgence of apparently “tra-
ditional” forms of teaching is the possibility of a new retro-
spective examination of history, more complex and richer in
virtual developments than those suggested in the politically
progressive version. Indeed, ever since the end of the Em-
pire, there have been attempts to preserve classic traditions
of teaching and self-transformation. These attempts have, in
particular, taken the form of re-opening shuyuan or tradi-
tional academies. The development of these institutions,
which have played a fundamental role in education in China
for over a thousand years, was strongest from the Song Dy-
nasty on, especially due to the influence of neo-Confucian
thinkers such as Zhu Xi.((10) Institutions of this kind had
been founded by the leaders of Confucian lineages to edu-
cate their members, by Confucian masters, and even, start-
ing in the Ming Dynasty, by the government.((11) In the six-
teenth century, under the influence of such figures as Wang
Yangming, academies also promoted broader access to edu-
cation. Throughout their history, they experienced the ten-
sion between self-cultivation and the goal of preparing for of-
ficial examinations, between integration in the public sphere
and resistance to official authority at times of great crisis.((12)
The reforms of the very last years of the Qing Empire were
intended to put an end to the structures of traditional teach-
ing. Paradoxically, scholars who were profoundly Confucian
were responsible for carrying out this dismantlement.((13)
Edicts in 1901, 1902, and 1904, reviving aborted reforms of
8. See Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianism, ‘Cultural Tradition’ and Official Discourses at the
Start of the Century,” China Perspectives, 2007/3, pp.50-65.
9. Liu Dong, “The Weberian View and Confucianism,” East Asian History, Australian Na-
tional University, 25-26 (2003), pp. 191-217. 
10. For a synthetic view of the history of the academies, see Li Hongqi (Thomas H. C. Lee),
“Shuyuan, chuantong xueshu de zhongxin” (The shuyan, centre of the traditional aca-
demic world), in Wang Shouchang and Zhang Wending (ed.), Zhongguo wenhua de
zhuancheng yu chuangxin, Beijing, Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006, p.355-64. For the
relationship between state policy and private initiative, see Alexander Woodside, “The
Divorce between the Political Center and Educational Creativity,” in Benjamin Elman and
Alexander Woodside, Education and Society in Late Imperial China, 1600-1900, Univer-
sity of California Press, 1994, pp. 458-492. See also Chen Wenyi, You guanxue dao
shuyuan (From official schools to academies), Taipei, Lianjing, 2004. Chen Wenyi in par-
ticular presents a broad picture of the state of research on academies. There have been
many discussions and many divergent points of view about the creation of the first
shuyuan. See, for instance, Li Caidong, Zhongguo shuyuan yanjiu (Research on the
academies in china), Nanchang, Jiangxi gaoxiao chubanshe, 2005, pp.319-22.
11. Thomas H.C. Lee points out that under the Ming, 60 percent of the academies were
founded by the government: Thomas H.C. Lee, “Academies: Official Sponsorship and
Suppression,” in Frederik P. Brandauer and Chun-chieh Huang (ed.), Imperial Rulership
and Cultural Change in Traditional China, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1994,
p.126. 
12. Thomas H.C. Lee, “Academies: Official Sponsorship and Suppression,” op.cit., p. 119.
This brings to mind in particular the Donglin academy in the seventeenth century. See
also Jacques Gernet, L’intelligence de la Chine, le social et le mental, Paris, NRF Galli-
mard, p.112
13. One may think in particular about Zhang Zhidong, who along with his peers resorted to
writing a memorial appealing for a thorough reform of the educative system maintain-
ing, nevertheless, a balance between Chinese learning and Western knowledge. Zhang
Zhidong was appointed Minister of Education in 1907. See William Ayers, Chang Chih-
tung and Educational Reform in China, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971,
pp.196-254.
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1898 and inspired by the Japanese example, instituted a
new format for schools (in particular the xuetang, which be-
came xuexiao in 1912) and called for establishing a system
to educate the general population. In 1905, the examination
system was abolished((14) and education was gradually liber-
ated, at least in part, from the domination of Confucian-
ism.((15) Chen Pingyuan suggests that although putting an
end to the system of examinations had been thoroughly
thought out, the decision to abandon the academies was
made precipitously and without any real prior discussion.((16)
During the 1920s and 30s, the question of the shuyuan gave
rise to a lively debate, and many regretted their disappear-
ance at the time. This was paradoxically the case for profes-
sors as westernized as Hu Shi, many of whom had studied
in the United States.((17)
In any event, a turn was taken that the authorities consid-
ered irreversible. But some intellectuals, such as Zhang
Taiyan, refused to participate in the new university system,
and their educative pursuits continued in a parallel context
outside of any real institutional framework.((18) Others tried
to recreate academies. This was the case with Ma Yifu
(1883-1967), who in 1939, with financial support coming
directly from Chiang Kai-shek, established the Fuxing
shuyuan at Leshan in Sichuan Province. This endeavour
continued until 1947, meeting up with many difficulties, in
particular that of maintaining academic as well as financial
independence.((19) There is also the case of Zhang Junmai
(1887-1969) and Zhang Dongsun’s Minzu wenhua
shuyuan, established in Dali (Yunnan Province) in 1938. Fi-
nanced by the Kuomintang, this establishment aimed at
combining Western and Chinese knowledge in order to con-
tribute to a “cultural renaissance” (wenhua fuxing) as well as
to the creation of a modern China.((20) Finally, the Mianren
shuyuan (Academy for the encouragement of benevolence)
was opened in Chongqing by another important Confucian,
Liang Shuming (1893-1988).((21) After 1949, the perpetua-
tion of the humanist spirit of self-cultivation based on the
classics was found on the periphery of China. The New
Asia College (Xin Ya shuyuan), for instance, founded in
Hong Kong by Tang Junyi (1909-1978) and Qian Mu
(1895-1990), managed to maintain for some time the ideal
of an academy adapted to modern times.((22) It must be em-
phasized that most of these thinkers were generally associ-
ated with the movement called “Contemporary Confucian-
ism,” about which the significant intellectual production is
often all that is remembered. It is clear that they consistently
aspired to a real-life commitment greater than the modest
one that was possible during these troubled times. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, reforms once again provided
space for reference to classic institutions, but in a context
that was fundamentally new. Placed symbolically under the
aegis of Liang Shuming, an Academy of Chinese culture
(Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan) was established at that mo-
ment of “cultural fever” and in the margins of all the official
institutions with the objective of initiating a broad public
(cadres, engineers, military, etc.) to classical culture and its
canonical works.((23) Ever since, in a more or less favourable
context, a growing enthusiasm for traditional education has
14. A detailed analysis of this whole process appears in the book by Gan Chunsong,
Zhiduhua rujia ji qi jieti (Institutionalized Confucianism and its dismantling), Beijing,
Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2003, pp.220-42. See also Zheng Yuan, “The Sta-
tus of Confucianism in Modern Chinese Education, 1901-49,” in Glen Peterson, Ruth
Hayhoe and Yonglin Lu (eds.), Education, Culture and Identity in Twentieth-Century
China, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2001, p.194-202.
15. In this respect, we can make a distinction between the institutions and the content of
the teachings. Once they were adopted, new institutions were never really in danger. The
substance of teachings related to Confucianism (reading of classics, dujing, and self-
cultivation, xiushen), on the other hand, has greatly evolved at different periods in time.
The first Minister of Education of the Republican era, Cai Yuanpei, proceeded to under-
take a broad “deconfucianisation” of the curriculum. Later, however, Yuan Shikai as well
as Chiang Kai-shek contributed to “reconfucianising” them to some degree and in a new
spirit. Ibid., p.202-16. Gan Chunsong, Zhiduhua rujia ji qi jieti, op.cit., p.236, table 5.2.
16. Chen Pingyuan, Daxue hewei (Why the university?), Beijing, Beijing daxue chubanshe,
2006, p.5.
17. Chen Pingyuan explains that 50 or so articles were published on the subject during this
period. Ibid., p. 3. He quotes in particular an article written by Hu Shi in 1924: “The aban-
don of academies, this is one of the most unfortunate things for our country” (p.6). More
generally, Suzanne Pepper shows that during the 1920s and 1930s, more and more
voices of all political persuasions criticised the unthinking adoption of Western models
for Chinese schools: Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education in Twentieth-Century
China, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.90. She also relates that young
Mao, at the very beginning of the 1920s, had a very nuanced point of view about the
system of traditional academies, condemning certain aspects while praising others.
Ibid., p.98.
18. In 1935 and 1936, Zhang Taiyan dispensed teaching in the context of a “Study and Dis-
cussion Seminar on National Studies” (guoxue jiangxi hui). Ibid., p.13.
19. Liu Mengxi, “Ma Yifu yu Fuxing shuyuan” (Ma Yifu and the Academy of the Return to Na-
ture), in Wang Shouchang and Zhang Wending (eds.), Zhongguo wenhua de zhuancheng
yu chuangxin, op.cit., pp.418-35. This article, which analyzes a large number of texts
and letters by Ma Yifu, gives a good idea of the nature of this enterprise and its difficul-
ties. It also provides insight into the relationship between Ma Yifu and Xiong Shili, who
came to teach at the academy. See also, for more factual information on the organiza-
tion of the shuyuan, Hu Zhaoxi, Sichuan shuyuan shi (History of Sichuan Academies),
Chengdu, Sichuan daxue chubanshe, p.383-86. 
20. Roger B. Jeans, Jr, Democracy and Socialism in Republican China, The Politics of Zhang
Junmai, 1906-1941, Boston, Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, pp. 72-94.
21. Hu Zhaoxi, Sichuan shuyuan shi, op.cit., pp.387-88.
22. See in particular Cheung Chan Fai, “Tang Junyi and the Philosophy of General Educa-
tion,” in Wm. Theodore de Bary, (ed.), Confucian Tradition and Global Education, Hong
Kong, The Chinese University Press, p.59 ff. A collection of articles and speeches
demonstrate Qian Mu’s activity as an educator when he was head of New Asia College:
Qian Mu, Xin Ya yiduo (Past echoes from New Asia), Beijing, Sanlian shudian, 2004.
23. See in particular Liu Mengxue, “Zhexue, wenhua, rensheng, jinian zhonnguo wenhua
shuyuan chengli ershi zhou nian” (Philosophy, culture and life; Commemorating the
twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the Academy of Chinese Culture); Wang
Chaomian, “Shuyuan yu jing shi zhi yong, zhi xing he yi” (Academies, Use of Classical
Texts, Unity of Knowledge and Action); “Bianzhe hou ji” (Editor’s Afterword), in Wang
Shouchang and Zhang Liding (eds.), Zhongguo wenhua de chuantong yu chuangxin,
op.cit., pp.587-98.
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manifested itself in an abundant intellectual production and
by a whole series of more recent initiatives to found
shuyuan, sishu or xuetang.((24) They went hand in hand with
a broader resurgence of interest in classic texts in society at
large. In this respect, the movement actively promoting the
teaching of Confucian classics to children was significant.
Coming from Taiwan, whose impact had been growing on
the mainland, this movement (ertong dujing yundong) was
probably the most spectacular manifestation of the different
appeals for the “renaissance of tradition.” It was marked by
the figure of a Taiwanese professor, Wang Caigui, who
claims to follow the spirit of Mou Zongsan and whose en-
gagement resembles that of Tu Weiming, but remains aimed
at the dissemination of Confucianism at the basic level (min-
jian shehui) rather than towards the academic world and in-
stitutions (Unesco, Parliament of Religions). To  l eave or  stay  inside  theacademic space?  The  path to  a new inst itutionalization 
Faced with an educational institution established in a rigid
manner during the years under Mao, what form can such a
movement take in fulfilling its aspirations the training of self
and other in accordance with “Confucian” heritage? The
situation at the beginning of the 2000s is complex, and the
strategies operating are very different. Educative practices
based on “Confucianism” may consider the modern institu-
tion of schools and universities as either an ally or adversary.
Three types of strategies can consequently be observed:
those that assert themselves within the very space of the cur-
rent institutions, those that deliberately try to establish rival
institutions, and those that attempt to divert or add a new ed-
ucative vocation to existing non-academic organizations
(such as profit-making enterprises) within society. The un-
derlying question in each instance is to determine the result-
ing relationship with the official institutional order: comple-
mentarity, rivalry, or substitution? 
Questions  ra ised within  the  academicinst itution 
During the first years of the 2000s, the emergence of vari-
ous strong movements served to relativise both of China’s
main university models from the twentieth century: the lib-
eral Western model that appeared at the beginning of the
century but became hegemonic after the 1919 May 4th
Movement; and the Communist model, inspired for a time
by the Soviet Union but reformulated by Chinese socialism
and the specific requirements of Maoist ideol-
ogy. Nowadays, appeals for a “renaissance of Confucian-
ism” within academia express a variety of sometimes contra-
dictory orientations, ranging from internal institutional re-
forms aimed at the student body and the intellectual commu-
nity, to militant activities that use the university as a base but
are directed at society at large. To illustrate these two dimen-
sions, we shall examine the People’s University (Renda)
and Peking University (Beida).   
Recent initiatives undertaken within People’s University to
support “traditional culture” are all the more significant
given that right from its inception during the Sino-Japanese
War, People’s University was closely connected to the Com-
munist Party. Its main purpose was to train ideologically re-
liable cadres to serve the government and the Party. In
2001, Renda became the first Chinese university to erect a
monumental statue of Confucius on its campus, and the fol-
lowing year it established an “Institute for Confucian Re-
search” (Kongzi yanjiuyuan) with generous operating funds.
This testifies to the current shift of the Communist Party
line towards a selective and critical re-appropriation of tradi-
tional culture.((25)
But discussions with various players in this enterprise reveal
the complexity of the situation, not only because these ini-
tiatives have met with resistance from cadres trained in
Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also because the true mean-
ing of these orientations remain the subject of different and
sometimes contradictory interpretations.   
According to one of the directors of the Kongzi yanjiuyuan,
the university finds itself in a national context where two dif-
ferent movements are developing: “There is an academic
movement (xueshu yundong) that only affects scholars. Its
objective is to go beyond such disciplines as philosophy,
which was not possible before. The second movement is so-
cial (shehui yundong). It aims to promote confidence in
one’s own culture and attend to the question of the spiritual
life (jingshen shenghuo) in the context of material develop-
ment of society. The movement for children to study the
classics is also a sign — what the education system cannot be
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24. From the very beginning of the 1980s, a large number of publications and lectures were
given on the subject of traditional academies. See Chen Pingyuan, Daxue hewei, op.cit.,
p.3 footnote 1. 
25. On the two important documents relating to point, the “Program to Put into Effect the
Construction of Citizen/Citizens’ Morality” (gongmin daode jianshe shishi gangyao) in
2001 and especially the “Program for the Development of Culture” inscribed in the 11th
Five-Year Plan (Guojia “shiyiwu” shiqi wenhua fazhan guihua gangyaode) of 2006, see
Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianism, ‘cultural tradition’ and official discourses in the
2000s,” op.cit.
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responsible for falls under the ambit of the ‘people’s space’
(minjian).”  
Two institutes founded by Renda give a better picture of the
stratified nature of the problem. The Institute of National
Studies (guoxueyuan) is still controversial. Its primarily intel-
lectual objective is to compensate for the fragmentation re-
sulting from the application of Western disciplinary logic to
the study of traditional Chinese culture, and allow students
to expand their study of “literature” or “philosophy” to train-
ing in philology and historical disciplines as well. This rea-
sonable aspiration to a more comprehensive access to classic
knowledge fell victim not so much to concerns over the dan-
ger of nationalist ideologisation((26) as to the problem of offi-
cial validation: in 2007, authorisation for the awarding of
master’s degrees (and a fortiori doctorates) had still not
been resolved. The second institute, the Kongzi yanjiuyuan,
whose president is philosophy historian Zhang Liwen, aims
to organise as well as manage research on Confucian culture
(the constitution of a “Confucian canon,” Ruzang, more or
less in competition with a similar enterprise at Beida, is one
of its projects), but also to encourage the teaching of tradi-
tional culture to non-specialist students.((27)
The official attitude towards Confucius remains relatively
ambiguous, reflecting the divergences that exist within
Renda itself. “The official line,” they say, “is the one previ-
ously defined by Zhang Dainian: Confucius is neither
praised nor criticized, he is studied. But some young special-
ists would like to go a step further. For them, Confucius is
not an ordinary man, but a sage or a saint (shengren): his
teachings are not only the object of academic research
(xueshu de yanjiu) but also of research on the Way and the
destiny of Man (rendao de yanjiu). Nevertheless, there is
also opposition to this approach.”((28)
The university has made another contribution to a Confu-
cian revival that extends beyond the student body to various
sectors of society at large. The most striking manifestation of
this intellectual activism is the flourishing training programs
offered to businessmen by Chinese universities (Beida and
Tsinghua having played a pioneering role in the capital due
to the high calibre of their faculty). For instance, since
2003, different faculties of Peking University (the Philoso-
phy Department, the Academy of Chinese Culture, Zhong-
guo wenhua shuyuan) have joined forces to organize “Na-
tional Study Classes” (guoxueban) for cadres and company
managers in the form of well-organized intensive training
courses that are remunerated accordingly.((29) The majority of
these businessmen (qiyejia) come from other provinces,
sometimes far from the capital. The classes are not lectures
but rather commented readings of classical texts, including
not only the Confucian classics but also the Yijing and
Sunzi’s Art of War as well as Taoist and Buddhist texts. The
sessions we were able to attend in 2006 did not include any
nationalist ideology and focused on familiarizing the partici-
pants with classical language and culture.  
This kind of direct experience makes it possible to go be-
yond overly simplified assessments. Naturally, the entrepre-
neurs may satisfy their own professional objectives, and the
instructors receive remuneration and recognition not easily
available these days in the field of literary disciplines. But
the majority of these businessmen and women have rela-
tively little interest in the virtues of “Chinese-style manage-
ment” (as practiced and exemplified by the South-East
Asian Dragons during the 1980s). Whether they are uned-
ucated entrepreneurs who have succeeded by dint of hard
work, or have fancy degrees and a fashionable life-style, they
share a common desire for this training, which is quite ex-
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26. This danger naturally exists, since classical knowledge was not “national” but purported
to be universal. It was the creation of national studies (kokugaku) by Japanese nation-
alism that contributed, as a reaction, at the beginning of the last century, to the rise of
Chinese “national studies” (guoxue) in opposition to Occidental knowledge, but partially
unfaithful, in their principle, to the deep inspiration of the Confucian tradition.
27. While this interest in traditional culture has been marked in a university particularly as-
sociated with ideological authorities, it has developed even more strongly in other insti-
tutions of high learning. For instance, regular lectures on national studies at
Guangzhou’s Sun Yat-sen University in 2006 attracted hundreds of students. In most of
China’s universities, such as the Shandong shifan daxue (Shandong Teachers’ Univer-
sity) in Jinan, extra courses of this type have increasingly become the norm .
28. Interview, Beijing, March 2007.
29. At Beida in 2006, businessmen enrolled for a year-long series of courses lasting 3-4
days each month at a cost of 26,000 RMB. A cycle lasting two years is also offered.
Statue of Confucius 
on the campus of Renda. 
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pensive, even though they are already “successful.” Their
motivations are primarily personal: access to culture that was
previously inaccessible and to resources for existential or
spiritual fulfilment (an shen li ming). The sincerity and the
pleasure that dominates these exchanges reveal a state of
mind that goes far beyond purely pragmatic utilitarianism.((30)
Thus, for the minority of activists or intellectuals committed
to spreading Confucian values, the present-day university
functions not only as a training ground for the student popu-
lation but also as a solid base for educative enterprises in so-
ciety at large. It has become apparent, however, that the
modern institution is not really suited to these new objec-
tives. Might it not be necessary to leave the university envi-
ronment in order to establish a new base that could illumi-
nate, in turn, the university institution? In fact, there is much
talk of the old study halls or academies for dispensing tradi-
tional knowledge being given rebirth in a new form.((31)
The situation of Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou
demonstrates the interest in this ancient ideal as well as the
difficulties of putting it into practice. In the middle of the
2000s, a number of teachers specializing in Chinese culture,
but without any credentials in the ideological structures of
the Confucian revival, made a plan to establish an “acad-
emy” in an ancient sanctuary outside the university that had
become a tourist attraction. They planned to use this Ling-
nan wenhua shuyuan to provide complementary instruction
to students and to a cultivated general public. Even though
the project received formal support from the authorities,
however, it fell through due to lack of financial backing.((32)
Clearly there is a “grey area” between the various degrees
of political control and haphazard economic resources where
projects for complementary or alternative instruction can be
realized. In reality, the success of this kind of endeavour
seems to depend on determination and activism from
sources that are not strictly academic or intellectual. 
Towards  autonomisat ion?  Betweencomplementar ity and substitution  
Presently, the most original initiatives come from outside the
university institution. They always need to negotiate special
relationships with the authorities according to modalities
specific to the particular place. We observe a sort of contin-
uum between the initiatives taken in the shadow of local au-
thorities, those taken in collaboration with them, and those
that try to be as autonomous as possible. 
The situation of small private schools (sishu) founded in the
Pearl River Delta with support from a district official in the
city of Dongguan demonstrates the role personal initiatives
can play at a local level. The ideas of Taiwanese philosopher
and educator Wang Caigui inspired a veritable “pedagogical
revelation” regarding the education of young children in a
woman responsible for cultural affairs, who wanted to pro-
mote traditional culture in an industrial city. “This it is a real
cultural desert,” says this energetic young woman from the
North. “Pollution is not only atmospheric. It is urgent to
propagate traditional culture. The readings of the classics we
encourage should be done on a volunteer basis and not for
commercial purposes. They should be based on individual
initiatives.” 
In a section of a park commemorating the virtues of Ming
Dynasty General Yuan Chonghuan, two classes are held for
children of 3 and 4 years old. Every day, three sessions are
dedicated to the “reading of the classics” (in other words,
reciting for memorization), and two others to basic knowl-
edge and good behaviour (small rituals of respect towards
teachers, etc.). The movement is presented as “popular”
(minjian), but the commitment of local cadres has made the
authorities more tolerant of instruction presented as “ex-
tracurricular interest classes” (kewai xingqu ban), and they
even provide classrooms free of charge.((33)
While these small, locally-established schools set modest ob-
jectives for themselves, other programs are designed for
young people and adults in the name of reviving study halls
(xuetang) or the more ambitious academies (shuyuan). This
is the case of the Yidan xuetang, founded in 2001 by Peng
Fei, a graduate of Beida who has become prominent in the
media and whose ambitions are national as well as local.  
Strategically located next to Peking University but outside
the actual campus, this organization is clearly conceived as
an enterprise for progressive reconstruction of a network of
institutions to revive not only the learning of classic culture
30. These university professors now also give lectures on classical thinking and culture to
cadres from the central administrations.
31. Besides, the notion of “shuyuan” has become sufficiently vague to be acceptable in a
conventional academic environment: the Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan, established at
Beida in the 1980s, was more of a patrimonial institution than a living community, and
the Xinya shuyuan (New Asia College) in Hong Kong, in spite of its prestigious begin-
nings, is now only one of several “colleges” under a university functioning on the Anglo-
American model.
32. Interview with the “Honorary Director” of the Lingnan wenhua shuyuan, Guangzhou, De-
cember 2006.
33. The existence of this cultural park makes it possible to present this small school as a
“Garden of national studies of the Great Harmony” (according to the homonymy that
makes the word “yuan” a park instead of an academy). Lodging is also provided to 20
children sent by families interested in traditional culture or moral instruction (zuoren); in
2007, they paid 600 RMB per month. The first “classic” studied by these very young
children is the Dizi gui, a text from the Qing dynasty enouncing the duties of the student.
Three masters provide instruction for each class.
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but also the experience of community and ritual. Peng Fei,
who has attracted an enthusiastic following, comes from a
modest worker family in Dongbei. His encounter with the
tradition of Chinese thinking occurred only after he began
studying Western philosophy at Beida.((34) He now heads a
network of supporters and part-time volunteers in several
provinces dedicated to the creation of an organized system
of schools and academies at some unspecified time in the fu-
ture. The current activities of Yidan have the more limited
scope of promoting classes and lectures in schools, enter-
prises, and media, while also of creating a core of activists
sharing common activities (training seminars, assemblies in-
cluding rituals, study trips, etc.).  
The nature of this organization could be defined as amphibi-
ous;((35) although it benefits from the support of prominent in-
tellectuals and a precarious but legal official status,((36) its ori-
entation is opposed to the essential spirit of the modern uni-
versity in either the liberal or Communist mode. The “na-
tional renaissance” (minzu de fuxing) to which it is commit-
ted requires a “cultural renaissance” (wenhua de fuxing)
that questions the nature of certain basic paradigms of West-
ern knowledge and pedagogy: 
We know that the schools and models of contempo-
rary teaching grew out of a movement of urbanization
and professional associations dating from the end of
the Middle Ages in Europe. It is a system based on
knowledge and the transmission of techniques, an ed-
ucative mechanism dedicated to rapid and industrial-
ized fabrication of “intellectual products.” So it is im-
portant to take into account that we are faced with an
instrumental rationality with no relation to a spiritual
life. The result is a huge carnival of knowledge, and
not the transmission of wisdom.((37)
This demand for of a kind of “wisdom” (zhihui) as opposed
to “knowledge” (zhishi) is an element common to many
movements in the “Confucian renaissance,” and should in-
spire a renewal of Chinese teaching establishments. But
given the inertia of the establishments and the conformist
tendencies of the elites attached to Western models, the
“space of the people” (minjian) has become the point of de-
34. Interview, Beijing, June 2006.
35. On the “amphibious” character of “civil society” in China, see X. L. Ding, “Institutional
Amphibiousness and the Transition from Communism: The Case of China,” British Jour-
nal of Political Sciences, vol. 23, n°3, 1994, pp. 293-318.
36. Administratively, the Yidan xuetang is accountable to a work unit called the “Chinese As-
sociation for the International Promotion of Science and Peace” (Zhongguo guoji kexue
yu heping cujin hui), which in turn is registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs
(Minzhengbu).
37. Yidan Xuetang tongxun (Yidan Xuetang Newsletter), no. 5 (December 2003), p.1.
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parture for this endeavour of regeneration. Such an idea can
be found in the words of Peng Fei: 
As limited as I may be, I think the system of spread-
ing the spirit of Chinese culture is tied to a disci-
ple/master relationship and to a form of oral transmis-
sion, in the way a father teaches a son. This should
be undertaken within society by the system of acade-
mies and study halls. Modern university and educa-
tive systems modelled on those of the United States
and Europe are completely incapable of this. Educa-
tion in China today also suffers from a similar short-
coming, which it cannot overcome. Because the es-
sential spirit of Chinese culture is anchored in civil so-
ciety and the masses, it is only by using concrete
methods and local situations as a point of departure
that we can return to our roots in order to look to-
wards new horizons and perpetuate the ideals of wis-
dom. This is the most critical issue in China today.
On such a foundation, a cultural renaissance can be
built and, if it occurs, there will be a national renais-
sance.((38)
In its educative spirit as well as in its vision of the “people,”
we observe the ambiguous nature of the Yidan xuetang’s re-
lationship to the university institution. While its long-term
ideal distances it from the type of rationality that governs the
university, it nevertheless continues to depend on permanent
exchanges with the academic community whose validity it
questions. The classes it managed to organize in Guangzhou
can also be seen at the fringes of Sun Yat-sen University:
propagative activities and volunteer work also bring together
educators who are well established in their institutions, from
primary school teachers to professors in university philoso-
phy departments. However, the propositions advanced by
the Yidan xuetang’s leader do not always receive unanimous
acceptance and are sometimes the object of divergent inter-
pretations.((39)
Another step towards becoming autonomous is made when
the structure established by the adepts of a “Confucian Ren-
aissance” acquires not only its very own locality but also the
permanent elements of community life. This is the case for
an institution in Guangdong that calls itself an academy, the
Pinghe shuyuan. Founded in 2005 in Zhuhai by a scientist
who went on to head a successful commercial language
school, this institution occupies two vast apartments in a
large modern compound. Its founder, who studied in the
United States and turned to “Confucianism” after a period
of belief in Bahaism, combines a spirit of enterprise and as-
sociation with successful Cantonese businessmen with a vi-
sionary conception devoid of erudition. He is open in a
rather undefined way to the religious and political as well as
educative aspects of Confucianism. Even though he has no
academic credentials, he maintains friendly relations with
professors known for their “cultural conservatism,” such as
Jiang Qing, the main theoretician behind “Political Confu-
cianism.” One of the Academy’s apartments serves as a
workplace for study or meetings, which are sometimes ac-
companied by simple rituals, while the other serves as a
guesthouse for boarders staying for varying lengths of time.
The academy employs several people on a full-time and part-
time basis. They share an enthusiasm for spreading Confu-
cian teachings, even though their backgrounds vary widely:
a former schoolmaster in charge of organising ceremonies
(births, marriages, etc.) in the region, a management spe-
cialist responsible for promoting the theory of good “human
relations” (lunli) in the businesses community, a teacher spe-
cializing in English but who also propagates “Han clothing,”
and a computer engineer who focuses on the Academy’s
website and the many relationships developing now on the
Internet among supporters of a “Confucian renaissance.”
The Pinghe shuyuan, funded by donations and the re-
sources of its directors, can be considered a “private” insti-
tution, but is nevertheless an official member of the “Asso-
ciation for Research on Traditional Culture” (Chuantong
wenhua yanjiuhui), which is registered with a department of
the local government.((40)
By combining idealist activism with economic realism, the
academy also introduces a third vector of educative engage-
ment that stems from Confucianism: firms and companies in
general (gongsi). Sometimes they are motivated by commer-
cial considerations or social strategy, but most often it is out
of conviction and personal commitment that businessmen
and women add an educative and cultural vocation to their
economic enterprise.  
Somehow, this situation has given rise to a crucial legal prob-
lem. It is difficult in China to receive official legal status
38. Yidan Xuetang tongxun (Yidan Xuetang Newsletter), no.4 (July 2003), p.1.
39. Peng Fei’s talents for inspiration and organisation has developed a network in
Guangzhou that brings together very different personalities: volunteer activists, stu-
dents, employees. A philosophy professor thus made a clear distinction between the
spirit of self-training and moral renaissance of which he approved, and the scientific and
democratic values to which he remained attached (interview, December 2006). We re-
discover this phenomenon everywhere that the Yidan Xuetang operates. The individuals
engaged in this organisation are far from sharing homogenous opinions on social and
political issues. Moreover, the management of Yidan Xuetang does not seem to require
such unanimity, but emphasises concrete action and self-cultivation.
40. Field observation, December 2006.
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when establishing a private institution whose activities cover
a quite a wide area, including social, cultural, and even reli-
gious dimensions.  
It is significant that a convert to Wang Caigui’s pedagogical
methods, the director of one of the main Chinese companies
specializing in the distribution of audio-visual material for
reciting and memorizing the classics by children (the Ertong
jingdian songdu gongcheng), insists on the fact that his com-
pany is not primarily commercial: “The model of a NGO
would have been more suitable for us, but officially we can
only be recognized as a company (gongsi).”((41) This com-
pany develops its activities on a national scale by supporting
small schools attracted to its programs, organizing competi-
tions of reading classics, (Lun Yu reading clubs), and lobby-
ing for official recognition of its objectives. It also shares
with the new xuetang and shuyan the practice of applying to
itself the educational and moral principles it promotes: the
20 or so employees of the company start their workday by
reciting the classics and participating in a weekly discussion
group.  
To this judicial context is also added a change in attitudes in
the economic sphere, where the traditional model of
rushang, the “literary merchant,” has undergone an unex-
pected modern evolution. This traditional notion, which de-
scribed development in the Ming Dynasty of a closer rela-
tionship between merchants and the milieus of Confucian
scholars,((42) is a sort of “floating signifier” in today’s China,
sometimes the subject of jokes, but also a strategy for social
recognition.((43) But the businessman who takes on (or more
frequently, since the term is considered flattering, does not
refuse) such a title does not do so merely to augment his
economic success with the symbolic capital of reputation.
For some, it expresses a responsibility and commitment that
is part of the daily life of their companies. In Guangzhou,
for instance, the head of a prosperous educational company
(jiaoyu jituan) is a realistic man aware of contemporary in-
tellectual issues. Though he rejects the religious and politi-
cal aspects of Confucianism, he upholds the message of
moral instruction promoting independence of character
(renge de duli) and “existential” education (shengming de
jiaoyu). While he affects a liberal attitude, he does not hes-
itate to provide his thousands of employees with courses in
national studies (guoxue), distributing bonuses to encourage
the best students.((44)
Although it is always difficult to determine whether ambition
takes precedence over personal commitment, certain experi-
ences suggest a genuine missionary vocation arising within
some gongsi. This was the case for a young woman from
Dongbei who experienced an existential crisis that led her
to Buddhism. The manager of a restaurant in Shenzhen, she
developed a commitment to Confucianism that led her to
systematically proselytize her employees as well as some of
her clients and their families. Her passion as an autodidact
(her library includes works of philosophy such as those of
Mou Zongsan), goes beyond organizing classes for children
to recite the classics, and she gives great importance to the
training and personal well-being of her employees, some of
whom have experienced the hardships of working in facto-
ries in the Dongguan region. Far beyond her pedagogical
conceptions, which we will examine a little later, this is a sig-
nificant albeit atypical case of a small business with a com-
munitarian vocation dedicated to an almost messianic degree
to the ideal of “Confucian renaissance.”((45)
We thus see the variety of solutions for reviving Confucian
teachings through institutional structures that sometimes ap-
pear in very unexpected forms. But whether it is in the con-
text of universities rethinking and broadening their educa-
tional vocation, of new institutions inspired by classic mod-
els, or of businesses taking responsibility for educative func-
tions, these militant movements exist in a new context with-
out which the rapidity and scale of their commitments would
be unthinkable — the means of communication made possi-
ble by the Internet. In fact, no “Confucian” organization of
any importance is without its own website, sometimes visited
daily by thousands of Internet users.((46) The Internet, more-
over, has become the main tool for isolated activists who are
just starting out. From Shenzhen to Qufu, we were able to
observe the effectiveness of these virtual networks, these
“immaterial academies,” in organising discussions as well as
41. Interview, Beijing, June 2006. Naturally, we have to take into consideration that this is a
version intended for foreign researchers working on Confucianism; the company is de-
scribed by other sources as having primarily commercial motivations. It is probable that
it was created for various reasons: it is first of all clearly a commercial enterprise, but
nevertheless run by individuals who also have a sincere interest in promoting the clas-
sics
42. About the emergence of this new “merchant spirit,” cf. Yu Ying-shih, Zhongguo jinshi
zongjiao lunli yu shangren jingshen (The modern religious ethic and the merchant spirit
in China), Taipei, Lianjing, 1987, pp. 99-166.
43. A training institute called Rushang at Zhejiang University tries to give management stu-
dents an indispensable complementary course on the subject of commercial ethics. Ac-
cording to its director, “The mentality of these young MBA graduates is often horren-
dous, and their ignorance of elementary rules of behaviour (without even mentioning
economic life) is a considerable liability.” (Interview, Qufu, October 2007).
44. Interview, Guangzhou, December 2006.
45. Interviews, Shenzhen, December 2006. In a forthcoming study, we will focus again on
the religious aspect of this particular enterprise.
46. Among the main websites dedicated to the revival of Confucianism, we may cite Yuan-
dao, Guoxue luntan (bbs.guoxue.com), Huaxia fuxing (hxfx.net), hanminzu.com, Confu-
cius 2000 (a more academic site), etc. 
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activities in common with participants from all regions of
China.((47)
Having thus presented a picture of the multiplicity of forms
taken by the “Confucian revival” in the context of educative
projects, we may now focus our attention on one of the domi-
nant features of this revival: its paradoxical anti-intellectualism. A modern anti - inte l lectual ism:the  body,  the  child,  the  people   
In  oppos it ion  to the  theoret i ca l:  the  body  
The motto of Yidan xuetang, “Less talk, more action,” re-
flects in general terms the deep suspicion of the theoretical
that characterises the current revival of Confucianism, in
which self-transformation is not an intellectual operation;
even if the text is assuredly one of its vehicles, it must en-
gage the whole person, including the body. The Yidan xue-
tang organizes regular sessions of morning readings of clas-
sic texts (like The Great Learning) in small groups held in
parks where passers-by are welcome to join. The sessions,
generally lasting 50 minutes, start with a series of gymnastic
exercises: 
These exercises are derived from ancient practices of
self-cultivation, which we have simplified and modi-
fied and which we continually try to improve. Their
purpose is to relax the body and the mind, to regulate
breathing (...).((48)
The small groups alternate different modes of reading (read-
ing by the coordinator to the other members, collective, al-
ternating, or solitary reading; varying rhythms, emphasizing
slowness, etc.). These methods make it possible to take into
account the variety of origins and “levels” of the participants
while stimulating their pleasure of learning as they steep
themselves in texts in different ways.((49) The goals of these
readings are explained in the following terms:  
One of the objectives of the morning reading is to
unify our knowledge with our actions (zhi xing he yi),
so it is appropriate not to read more than one chap-
ter of the Analects of Confucius each week. We read
and reread it so as to learn it by heart and be able to
recite it. Establishing a connection between our daily
lives and passages of the Analects in this gentle way
allows them to truly innervate our lives. The second
objective is to cultivate our nature — if we spend a lit-
tle more time and go to a place with a wide
panorama, a pleasant landscape, and start with a ses-
sion of physical exercises, and if we also choose a
slow reading rhythm to give us a sense of the eternal,
all of these things serve mainly to purify our hearts,
cultivate our natures and strengthen our “noble spirit”
(hao ran zhi qi).((50)
Continuing to read the classics in the morning can en-
able our negative (literally “muddy”) energy to purify
itself. This energy (qi) and our spiritual dimension
(shen) reach a state of perception and serenity (shen
qing qi shuang). Not only does our body strengthen
itself, but we obtain access to greater authenticity and
a fuller, more unified form of humanity. From the
classics, we become aware of the roots of our culture,
and we are surprised to discover that the ancients
were confronted with the same problems we are,
even if in different forms. Since they remain identical
nonetheless, we can draw from the classics wisdom
that is still effective. Through this daily exercise of
reading, we enter into daily exchanges with the
sages.((51)
These testimonies are not intended as theoretical explana-
tions, but as a sharing of and reflection upon the actual ex-
perience of self-transformation, which originates in the body.
The process is that of incorporation of the text, an experi-
ence of savouring and impregnation, facilitated by physical
exercises, breathing, and slowness. These testimonies in-
clude an attempt to suggest explanations of what is experi-
enced (purification of “muddy energy,” evocation of authen-
ticity and of access to a fuller form of humanity, etc.). But
what really matters is the emphasis on temporary access to
another state (serenity, perception) and the more lasting
feeling of self-transformation, which is not an act of faith, but
a real experience, accessible to everyone. These experiences
are nourished by the back-and-forth movement between
47. Interviews, Qufu, March and October 2007; Shenzhen, December 2006. The situation is
perhaps represented by the creation of an “academy” that is still immaterial, the Zhusi
shuyan, founded by people from relatively modest backgrounds (specialized workers,
teachers) in the old “holy city” of Qufu in Shandong Province. Another example of an in-
dividual initiative is the development of the new site, shiru.cn, which promotes practical
Confucianism. These sites may not be very influential, but exemplify new forms of ac-
tivism.
48. Yidan Xuetang tongxun (Yidan Xuetang Newsletter), No.9, January 2006, p.2.
49. Ibid, p.2. 
50. Ibidem.
51. Ibidem.
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daily life and texts that are constantly repeated and thus pro-
gressively memorized. For most people we met, the effec-
tiveness of this process was self-evident.  
This valorisation of concrete experience, of a total commit-
ment of the person and his acts, is also found in the Yidan
xuetang‘s activities in the countryside. For some Confucians
nowadays, the soil and the world of the peasant are invested
with a strong “mystique” or imaginary dimension. The proj-
ect of reconstructing Chinese civilization based on the coun-
tryside thus makes Liang Shuming a tutelary figure for these
reinvented genealogies. The example of barely educated
peasants gaining access to wisdom and illumination from
their own experience, far removed from intellectual
pedantry, is also held up as a model for the Yidan xuetang.
In view of this, it is not surprising that the movement invites
its participants to return to the countryside, in particular by
arranging field trips. Without the means to organise truly
structured activities in the countryside, this orientation
mainly serves as a rite of initiation — plunging into the peas-
ant world and striding along country paths becomes for these
young urbanites a much more tangible, almost physical, ex-
perience of the Chinese civilisation of their dreams.  
We have now seen that the anti-intellectualism of the popu-
lar Confucian revival can take the form of a self-cultivation
that engages the whole person. However, this anti-intellectu-
alist position can also be expressed as an endeavour to trans-
form and shape other people: in that case, its attention is fo-
cused on the child. 
Transformation o f  se lf ,  t ransfo rmat ion ofthe  o ther :  the  child  
The movement called “children read the classics” (shao er
dujing) is one of the most spectacular phenomena of the
present return to traditional culture. Even if these classes are
not limited exclusively to Confucian texts,((52) the four books
(The Great Learning, The Analects of Confucius, The
Doctrine of the Mean and Mencius) are nevertheless the
preponderant reference. We have seen that the movement
has developed in very different environments: (remuner-
ated) private schools where children attend reading classes
every week in addition to their obligatory curriculum; study
periods in public schools between classes or after school; in-
formal associations of friends and neighbours who hire a
teacher; reactivated traditional structures (sishu, xuetang,
shuyuan); and enterprises where directors, inspired by Con-
fucianism, invite their employees and their families to read
the classics. It is difficult to provide statistics on this move-
ment, but all indications suggest that it is gathering tremen-
dous force and may be affecting millions of children.  
The role of Wang Canggui, a Taiwanese disciple of Mou
Zongsan, has already been mentioned. He has played an
important role not only in promoting these readings of the
classics, but also as a “theoretician” of education. The teach-
ing he recommends is based on an analysis of children’s ca-
pacities, which is not based on ability to understand knowl-
edge, but on the development of the child in four successive
phases according to age.((53) The second phase, which is cen-
tred on reading classic texts, is for children from four to 13
years old. Characterised by a very strong capacity to memo-
rize and a fairly weak capacity for comprehension, this phase
stresses the accumulation of basic knowledge that will serve
the children throughout their lives, even if they are not able
to understand it for the time being. This knowledge, which
aims to nourish “the moral intelligence of the sages” and
“cultivate the rectitude of the heart/mind, of nature and of
action,” consists of the progressive assimilation of the clas-
sics, “starting with the most difficult and going towards the
simpler” (cong nan dao yi), in other words going in the op-
posite direction of comprehension ease. It is only much later,
as their capacity to understand develops progressively, that
the classics become intelligible resources for these children,
illuminating their daily lives, their acts, and their choices.  
We were able to attend several teaching sessions of classic
texts in different contexts and were also able to talk with the
instructors. The children read and reread the texts collec-
tively — out loud — until they memorized them completely.
The tone was usually monotonous and mechanical, the
rhythm often fast, in marked contrast to the deliberate cult
of slowness practiced by the young participants of the Yidan
xuetang. In fact, memorization is less an objective than a
consequence. The children are not pushed to retain for the
sake of recitation, but constant repetition of the texts results
in the children ultimately memorising them with increasing
ease, to the point where they can recite long passages and
sometimes even complete texts.((54) This is the case for
52. Our interlocutors often told us that the children could also be introduced to Taoist texts
and to Western “classics,” including Shakespeare.
53. Wang Caigui, “Ertong jingdian songshu de jiben lilun” (Fundamental theory for children
reciting classics), in Jingdian daodu shouce, Beijing, Beijing shifan daxue yinxiang
chubanshe, 2005, p.4-10. In the same manual see (by Anonymous but inspired by the
theories of Wang Caigui) “Wanmei de rencai, rensheng si jieduan jiaoyu linian” (The per-
fect man, conceptions of four phases of education of the individual), pp.1-3.
54. Jacques Gernet also points out that the term du (used in the expression dujing) carries
the double meaning both of reading and rote learning. Jacques Gernet, “L’éducation des
premières années (du 11ème au 17ème s.),” in Christine Nguyen Tri and Catherine De-
speux (eds.), Education et instruction en Chine, vol.1, L’éducation élémentaire, Paris and
Leuven, Editions Peeters, 2003, p. 41.
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“Western classics” as well: we heard children recite entire
sonnets of Shakespeare, which they had memorized through
phonetic Chinese transcriptions and recordings without
speaking a single word of English. Parents and teachers all
say how much they enjoy these readings (le zai qi
zhong).((55) The diametrically opposite example constantly
cited is the teaching of mathematics in the modern educa-
tion system, where children are considered to have difficulty
assimilating knowledge that is not useful (either profession-
ally or for personal development), and which is beyond their
abilities.((56) The reading of the classics is also accompanied
by the teaching of “rites,” which are most often little rules of
behaviour (greeting adults with a slight bow, dressing neatly,
being tidy, etc.) modelled on the precepts of someone like
Zhu Xi, who like other Neo-Confucian reformers insisted
on the importance of having children acquire physical habits
and better control of themselves.((57)
The conceptions of education promoted in the reading of
classics naturally have strong historical roots.((58) Jacques
Gernet, in a study on early education of children based on
texts from the Song to the Qing dynasties, explains that
“Chinese authors are very careful to specify the ages in
terms of the development of the child.” The role of memory
before puberty is emphasised: for Lu Shiyi (1611-1672),
“children under 14 have not been troubled by sexual feel-
ings, have good memories, and little comprehen-
sion.”((59) Thus, it is necessary to take advantage of the ex-
treme malleability of these years — especially before 10 — to
instil basic teachings. But Jacques Gernet also shows that
theories differed regarding the necessity of making children
understand the content of the texts. Though Xie Zhaoshe
(1567-1624) insisted on the benefits of rote learning without
comprehension, others such as Wang Yun (1764-1854)
were extremely critical of this approach.((60) The rather
marked dissociation of learning from comprehension that is
often found among contemporary Confucians is not, there-
fore, necessarily legitimised by historical precedent. In any
event, there seemed to be a common emphasis on the im-
portance to be given to texts considered the most precious.
Cheng Duanli (1271-1345), followed by Lu Shiyi, maintain
that commentaries should be set aside for concentration on
the Four Books and the Five Classics, the cornerstones of
the Confucian body of work.((61)
This valorisation of the fundamental texts is also an important
feature of the contemporary movement in China. While these
activists may rightfully refer to historical tradition in legitimis-
ing their practices, the emphasis is deliberately placed on di-
rect literal access to ancient texts without any kind of interpre-
tative mediation. Pushing aside exegetes and commentators,
and along with them the whole hermeneutic tradition that was
an important part of Confucian teaching, presents a more gen-
eral problem: that of the possible development in today’s
China of a specific form of “Confucian fundamentalism.”
The effectiveness attributed to this particular approach to the
canonical texts without mediation is striking, and was already
advocated by the young adults of the Yidan xuetang men-
tioned above. But parents we met also considered this train-
ing a fundamental source of education for their children. For
the small fringe of the most radical militants, who go as far as
taking their children out of the compulsory education system
and put them in private sishu, the reading of these texts
seems to be endowed with a unique and almost magical qual-
ity — the child who learns them will necessarily be faster than
others, his ability to integrate with society (hequn) will in-
crease, and the path of the sages will be open to him.
A poster promoting the reading of the classics by
children. The inscription on the right asks the question:
“Have you read the Analects of Confucius?” 
© Sébastien Billioud
55. Historically, many authors have nevertheless underlined the extremely disagreeable na-
ture of this mechanical method of learning, even when they were genuinely convinced
of its effectiveness. See, for example, the case of Xie Zhaozhe (1567-1624) discussed a
little further on.
56. The teaching of mathematics, while very strongly promoted in China, is denounced vig-
orously by Wang Caigui: “Ertong jingdian songshu de jiben lilun,” op.cit., pp. 8-9.
57. Ibid., p.25. 
58. Many studies have been made of the education of children and of the methods of learn-
ing Chinese classics. See, for instance, the writing of Thomas H.C. Lee on the Song, or
more recently, the very interesting work by Bai Limin, Shaping the Ideal Child, Hong
Kong : The Chinese University Press, 2005.
59. Jacques Gernet, “ L’éducation des premières années (du 11ème au 17ème s.),” op.cit.,
p. 38.
60. Jacques Gernet translates a text by Wang Yun: “The students are human beings, not
dogs or pigs. Learning texts by heart without explaining their meaning is like reciting su-
tras or chewing on a piece of wood.” Ibid., p. 42. In the same spirit, Jacques Gernet
shows that Qing author Tang Biao is also extremely critical of mechanical learning,
whereas Wang Rixiu, from the late North Song Dynasty, maintains that children should
be given an explanation of the texts they learn by heart. 
61. Ibid, p.37.
The movement for promoting the classics expresses itself in
a triangular relationship between children, parents, and mas-
ters. In reality, the breeding ground for transmission of the
texts is less the individual than the family group. Indeed, par-
ents are encouraged to accompany their children’s reading at
home, and may  also participate in collective recitations that
bring different generations together, thereby regaining con-
tact with their traditional culture. 
For the masters, the child presents an opportunity for wider
diffusion of the texts. However, distinctions must be made
when referring to the role of the master. The “master” can
of course be the person who directs the reading sessions, but
he can also be the activist responsible for promoting the clas-
sics, and who uses the child strategically or politically as a
lever to promote cultural renaissance. These two kinds of
masters are radically different, and their complementarity
provides insight into the “charisma” at work in the dujing
movement. In his research on the qigong movements that de-
veloped in the 1990s, David Palmer evokes the connection
that exists between the masters, the adepts, and the qi
(breath/energy) itself. He thus shows that qi, as a force that
can be experienced physically, produces and reinforces
charismatic relationships; qi becomes the substrate for the
master’s charisma, even if this produces the secondary effect
of undermining his personal authority.((62) The role of qi can
be compared with that of recitation (du) of the classics even
if the actual physical aspect of the two experiences is notice-
ably different. Nevertheless, we have previously mentioned
the “incorporation” of the text, its performative nature and
recitation as a practice of personal transformation: there is
an objective power resulting from “incorporation” of the
text, a power that can be experienced by each person as in
the case of qi. Charisma is primarily expressed through the
reading of the text.((63) In that context, the personal charisma
of the master directing the readings tends to be insignificant.
We were able to observe this when visiting several private
sishu in the Pearl River Delta: at one of them, the parents
had chosen as “masters” young girls around 20 years old
without university educations, who had themselves become
acquainted only recently with the Confucian texts. Their
main “qualification” was their ability to share their aspira-
tion to self-cultivation, and thereby offer moral credibility.((64)
Confucianism outside  of  the  e l i te :  the  peopl e   
The actual revival of Confucianism has broad popular roots.
Many activists come from modest backgrounds, peasant or
working-class. Peng Fei, the charismatic director of Yidan
xuetang, is one example; we have already mentioned his
openly acknowledged working-class background. Today, ac-
tivists who create Confucian websites, organise reading
groups of the classics in society, invite employees to read the
classics in their enterprises, and even open schools, are often
from similar backgrounds. They have not necessarily at-
tended universities, and their rediscovery of Confucian tra-
dition follows very different paths.((65) It is clear that this phe-
nomenon, on the whole, is not a top-down movement led by
an academic or politically institutionalised “elite” (jingying):
it is a popular endeavour (pingmin) in both origin and voca-
tion.((66) In addition to the activists, supporters, and sympa-
thizers of this movement, who are sometimes recruited from
more privileged classes of society (students, cadres, and
members of the business community), there are also large
numbers of salaried employees and workers.((67)
Thus, during a discussion group about traditional culture and
Confucianism at the previously mentioned Shenzhen restau-
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62. David Palmer, “Rationalizing Re-enchantment : Charisma, Affiliation and Organization in
Contemporary Body Cultivation Movements,” a paper presented at The International
Conference on Religion and Social Integration in Chinese Societies, Hong Kong, 28-30
June 2007, p.7. (Forthcoming in Nova Religio).
63. The charisma also comes, via the reading of the text, from the authority imparted to it
by Chinese history and tradition. Obviously these two aspects are also relevant as far as
parents are concerned.
64. Field observation, June 2007.
65. In a future article, we will examine the motivations that push people to turn to Confu-
cianism and classical culture. We do not have comprehensive statistics on the social ori-
gins of the Confucian activists, but we have observed the frequency of this phenome-
non during many extensive interviews with activists in various regions of China.
66. This doesn’t, of course, mean that there are no intellectuals participating actively in this
movement. 
67. Our study up to now has been carried out for the most part in urban and peri-urban
areas, and further field investigation would be necessary to obtain a better understand-
ing of the situation in the rural areas.
This poster promoting the reading of the classics
proclaims: “Marching forward with the classics, becoming
friend with the Sages.” The first of the volumes presented
on the poster encompasses three famous texts of the
Confucian corpus: The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the
Mean and The Classic of Filial Piety.  
© Sébastien Billioud
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rant, about 50 or so people in the audience came from mod-
est backgrounds and various age groups. Among them: work-
ers, owners of small businesses, and restaurant employees
(waiters, a cook). Some with “peasant household registra-
tion” (nongmin hukou) had come to look for work in the
city, whereas others had jobs as manual labourers for govern-
ment enterprises. Several told us they had become dedi-
cated to the practice of daily readings of the Analects of
Confucius, going so far as to memorise them in classical —
not vernacular — Chinese. They openly expressed their
pleasure at having access to this form of culture, and regret
at not having done so earlier. We observed comparable phe-
nomena in other cities and contexts.((68)
What are the references for this kind of “Confucianism for
the masses”? Rarely are they scholarly academic treatises.
Direct access to the ancient texts is the priority; when com-
mentaries are taken into account, it is primarily to shed light
on the relationship between the teachings of the sages and
concrete daily life. The role of the intellectual Nan Huaijin,
a specialist and propagator of Buddhism who went to Tai-
wan as a refugee in 1949, is important in this respect: his
works have been very popular on the mainland ever since
1990 as much on account of his personality as for his per-
sonalized reading of the classics (including Confucian ones),
which for many people constitute an entry into traditional
culture. In a somewhat comparable spirit, the Yidan xuetang
recently edited three works from the late Qing Dynasty writ-
ten by a certain Wang Fengyi, a peasant who “gained aware-
ness of The Way” (wu dao).((69) In his introduction to these
works, Peng Fei stresses the fact that Wang never had any
formal education and that his wisdom was above all
grounded in life experience: “This rural language he uses,”
declares Peng, “is the living language of life.” In other
words, the teaching originates from the common people and
returns to the common people. It avoids the detour made by
the sophisticated discourse of the so-called elite. It is the dif-
fusion of this rediscovered tradition among the masses that
will enable a renaissance of culture and the nation. 
Indeed, the relationship between the “people” and the
“elite” no longer offers the neat simplicity that still charac-
terised it in the 1980s, when intellectuals, united in a widely
shared vision of their role as defenders of the “Enlighten-
ment,” spontaneously considered themselves to represent
the superior interests of a nation faced with the authoritari-
anism of political and ideological power. The former model
of “universal intellectual” was replaced by much more diver-
sified figures: independent academics, media intellectuals,
think tankers, militants committed to the recognition of spe-
cific rights... The relationship of the intellectual to the “peo-
ple” evolved to the same degree as his relationship to the
State. In this we can see tensions that were unthinkable be-
fore: the idea of the “intellectual against the people” (and
the reverse) has now become a perfectly acceptable model.  
Intellectuals with different qualifications who consider them-
selves part of the Confucian revival sometimes diverge in
their critical assessment of the manifestations of “popular
Confucianism” (minjian rujia). Some radical cultural conser-
vatives extol the virtues of authoritarian Confucianisation
controlled by an elite who would take into account both na-
tional interests and cultural tradition.((70) Some other intellec-
tuals are critical of the vulgarisation of teaching and the pop-
ulist derivations they can produce. Thus Peng Guoxiang, a
Tsinghua professor, cautioned at the end of 2006 against the
risk of “narrow nationalism,” which he considered “the kiss
of death” for Confucianism.((71) Accordingly, he called for a
serious study of the Confucian tradition in view of its au-
thentic “re-establishment” (chongjian ruxue chuantong).
Naturally, this serious study is subject to the intellectual cre-
dentials of those who speak in the name of Confucianism.
The expression of the ambiguous relationship between the
“Confucian” intellectual and popular movements is particu-
larly clear in a veritable social phenomenon — the reading of
the classics by Yu Dan.  
A professor of media studies, Yu Dan is not a specialist in
Confucianism. In October 2006, Central Television
(CCTV) invited this charismatic woman to create a pro-
gram on the Analects of Confucius. In this program, she
gives a lively presentation of a text accompanied by commen-
taries that emphasises personal experience and daily life.
The program has been a triumphant success, and the book
based on it has sold millions of copies. Reactions to this phe-
nomenon, however, vary widely. Some prominent intellectu-
als support Yu Dan. For instance, a discussion article by
68. Popular Confucianism often means to be “useful” and applicable in resolving concrete
problems. The meeting to which we have just referred dealt for the most part with the
positive role that traditional culture could play for educating children. For this reason, it
was centred on sharing experiences, each person revealing his problems, and the coor-
dinator of the session offering solutions. There is even a Confucian website calling itself
shijian ruxue, “Practical Confucianism” (see note 46).
69. Wang Fengyi, Cheng ming lu (On the brilliance of authenticity – vol. 1), Du xing lu (On a
firmly established practice – vol. 2), Changchun, Jilin sheying chubanshe, 2003. Wang
Fengyi, Jiating lunli jiangyanlu (On family morality, vol. 3), Beijing, Yishu yu renwen
kexue chubanshe, 2006.
70. See for instance Kang Xiaoguang, Renzheng, Zhongguo zhengzhi fazhan de di san jiao
daolu (Policy based on humanity, a third way for Chinese political development) Singa-
pore, Global Publishing, 2005.
71. Peng Guoxiang, “Ruxue fuxing de shensi” (Considerations on the renaissance of Confu-
cianism), Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao, 18/12/2006, pp.34-35. 
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philosopher Li Zehou points out that “her contribution was
to reawaken an interest in the classics.”((72) He describes Yu’s
role as not that of an intellectual but of a preacher or an
evangelist (budaoshi) who serves as a bridge between the
elite and the common people (jingying yu pingmin zhijian
de qiaoliang). Li Zehou also explains that the religious di-
mension of Confucianism has certainly been well presented
by the scholarly works of contemporary Confucianists such
as Mou Zongsan, but that the complexity and abstract na-
ture of their formulations limit their effect on society. What
is openly acknowledged here is the inevitable and desirable
division of tasks between the scholar and the media popu-
lariser. The intellectual historian Ge Zhaoguang also recog-
nises certain positive aspects of the phenomenon, but goes
on to emphasise the responsibility of the elites for the pres-
entation and the popular diffusion (tongsuhua, pujihua) of
the classics. He feels they should have better control of the
difficult art of vulgarisation “in order to progress in concert
with the general population, and not be pulled down by it
(yao gongtong tisheng bu neng jiti chenlun).”((73) Many aca-
demic criticisms, however, point out errors committed by Yu
in her interpretation of the texts and the superficiality of her
analyses. For her detractors, Yu is simply not qualified to ex-
press herself on the subject. In an effort to have her book
withdrawn, 10 doctoral candidates signed a widely-circulated
petition in which they denounced the betrayal of the teach-
ings of the old master and the way he was being thrown into
the pasture of the ignorant masses.  
At present, the two poles of the Confucian revival — ping-
min (common people) and zhishi jingying (intellectual
elites) — still do not communicate much with each other, but
there are, of course, areas of mutual permeability, and many
intellectuals participate in the current movement of ruxue
fuxing. This is particularly apparent in the revival of the clas-
sic institution within the university. A number of university
professors also support the idea of social and educative com-
mitment inspired by Confucianism and going beyond the
narrow horizon of their professional obligations. It is, how-
ever, necessary to take into account the gap between the ac-
ademic world, which hardly expected the resurgence of in-
terest for cultural tradition, and the forms this tradition takes
today as it becomes progressively re-appropriated by the gen-
eral population.  
China has experienced the development of a series of ed-
ucative movements in the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Claiming to be different forms of “Confucianism,” they
are striking in their scope as well as their variety. This does
not represent a rejection of the educative revolution that oc-
curred in the 20th Century, but rather a relativisation that
expresses itself in the reshaping of the historical conscience,
placing the past century in a more modest position between
the glory of the imperial era and the uncertain promises of
a future power on an international scale. It also expresses it-
self not by simply revalorising a prestigious heritage, but by
an active, inventive, and unpredictable exploration of new
forms of training that are not necessarily forms of indoctrina-
tion. The fact that these initiatives often emanate from the
“people” (however this term may be interpreted) indicates
that they are not purely ideological phenomena that can be
reduced to mere political instrumentalisation or the inven-
tion of a new cultural market. In its most extreme forms, this
is certainly a minority movement, but its motivations are
deeper, and it merits an attentive examination. 
We have undertaken this analysis of the present aspirations
of a “Confucian revival,” taking into consideration its educa-
tive dimension, because this particular dimension can be ex-
pressed with relative freedom in the official institutional area
— or in a calculated relationship of distance from it. But the
educative practice is naturally part of a larger cultural con-
text. “Self-transformation” also carries the hope of being
able to justify such an enterprise by referring to values that
transcend the worldly, and to receive some kind of official
recognition from government authorities: religion and poli-
tics are necessarily on the horizon of such ambitions.  
In a recent article, the historian Yu Yingshi emphasised the
importance in the Chinese cultural tradition of a hierarchy
of notions and of roles that secularisation clearly has not
been able to eliminate: “Heaven, earth, prince, parent, mas-
ter.” In villages, these five characters are still sometimes writ-
ten in “parallel sentences,” even if, from the beginning of the
Republican era, the prince (jun) has been replaced by the
national state (guo): “Today, whether we do research on the
culture of the elite (shangceng) or that of the general popu-
lation (minjian wenhua), the value system expressed by
Tian di jun qin shi calls for our attention.”((74) The upheavals
of the twentieth century have certainly undermined this hi-
erarchical universe to some extent, but for any appeal to a
72. “Li Zehou : tamen shi jingying he pingmin zhijian de qiaoliang” (Li Zehou: They are the
bridge between the elite and the general population), interview with Li Zehou in Nanfang
Zhoumou, 22/03/07, p.28.
73. “Ge Zhaoguang : yao gongtong tisheng bu neng jiti chenlun” (We must rise together, not
pull each other down), interview with Ge Zhaoguang, in Nanfang Zhoumou, 22/03/07, p.
28.
74. Yu Yingshi, “Tan ‘Tian di jun qin shi’ de qiyuan” (On the origins of ‘Heaven, earth, ruler,
parents, masters’), Xiandai ruxue lun (On contemporary Confucianism), Taipei, Global
Publishing, 1996, p. 101.
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Glossary
An shen li ming 安身立命
Beida 北大
budaoshi 布道師
Chen Pingyuan 陳平原
Cheng Duanli 程端禮
chongjian daode 重建道德
chongjian ruxue
chuantong 重建儒學傳統
chuantong 傳統
Chuantong wenhua 
yanjiuhui 傳統文化研究會
cong nan dao yi 從難到易
dazhong wenhua 大眾文化
Donglin 東林
du 讀
dujing 讀經
ertong  dujing yundong  兒童讀經運動
Ertong jingdian
songdu gongcheng 兒童經典誦讀工程
Fuxing shuyuan 復性書院
Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光
gongsi 公司
guo 國
guoxue 國學
guoxueban 國學班
guoxueyuan 國學院
hao ran zhi qi 浩然之氣
Hu Shi 胡適
Jiang Qing 蔣慶
jiaohua 教化
jiaoyu jituan 教育集團
jiapu 家譜
jingshen shenghuo 精神生活
jingying 精英
jingying yu pingmin 精英與平民
zhijian de qiaoliang 之間的橋梁
jun 君
kewai xingqu ban 課外興趣班
Kongzi yanjiuyuan 孔子研究院
le zai qi zhong 樂在其中
Li Zehou 李澤厚
Liang Shuming 梁漱溟
Lingnan wenhua  
shuyuan 嶺南文化書院
Lu Shiyi 陸世儀
lunli 倫理
Ma Yifu 馬一浮
Mianren shuyuan 勉仁書院
minjian rujia 民間儒家
minjian  shehui 民間社會
minjian wenhua 民間文化
minzu de fuxing 民族的復興
Minzu wenhua shuyuan民族文化書院
Mou Zongsan 牟宗三
Nan Huaijin 南懷瑾
nongmin hukou 農民戶口
Peng Fei 逄飛
Peng Guoxiang 彭國翔
Pinghe shuyuan 平和書院
pingmin 平民
pujihua 普及化
Qian Mu 錢穆
qi 氣
qigong 氣功
qimeng 啟蒙
qiyejia 企業家
qu 區
Renda 人大
rendao  de  yanjiu 人道的研究
renge de duli 人格的獨立
rujia  儒家
rujiao 儒教
rushang 儒商
ruxue fuxing 儒學復興
Ruzang 儒藏
shangceng 上層
shao’er dujing 少兒讀經
shehui yundong 社會運動
shen 神
shengming de jiaoyu 生命的教育
shengren 聖人
shi 師
shuyuan 書院
sishu 私塾
sixiang 思想
Tang Biao 唐彪
Tang Junyi 唐君毅
tian di jun qin shi 天地君親師
tongsuhua 通俗化
Wang Caigui 王財貴
Wang Fengyi 王鳳儀
Wang Rixiu 王日休
Wang Yangming 王陽明
Wang Yun 王筠
wenhua fuxing 文化復興
wenhua zixin 文化自信
wenyi fuxing 文藝復興
Xie Zhaozhe 謝肇淛
Xin Ya shuyuan 新亞書院
xiushen 修身
xueshu 學術
xueshu de yanjiu 學術的研究
xueshu yundong 學術運動
xuetang 學堂
xuexiao 學校
yao gongtong tisheng, 要共同提升，
bu neng jiti  chenlun 不能集體沉淪
Yidan xuetang 一耽學堂
Yu Dan 于丹
Yu Yingshi 余英時
Zhang Dainian 張岱年
Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀
Zhang Junmai 張君勱
zhihui 智慧
zhishi 知識
zhishi jingying 知識精英
zhi xing he yi 知行合一
Zhongguo wenhua 
shuyuan 中國文化書院
Zhu Xi 朱熹
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“Confucian” future, this imaginary order nevertheless consti-
tutes the fabric of new and interdependent enterprises, some
of which are called upon to become realities while others
will surely remain partially virtual. 
In a way, it is the figure of the master (shi) that has held our
attention, even in his paradoxical anti-intellectual manifesta-
tion. Two forthcoming studies will focus on the relationship
of the master to new personalities, and their attempt to pro-
vide new interpretations of the word “Confucianism” in the
spheres of religion and politics. •
• Translated by Nina Levin Jalladeau
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